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Since being named acting president of 
Russia in 1999, Vladimir Putin has gone from 
a little-known ex-KGB agent to one of the 
most powerful men in the world. Handpicked 
by his ailing predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Putin 
came to power following a decade of 
economic turmoil and political instability. His 
decisiveness, especially in regard to civic 
uprisings in Chechnya, garnered early support 
among the Russian people. 1 In fact, Putin’s 
approval ratings remained high even as his 
actions became increasingly authoritarian. 2 
Given Russia’s position of power and its 
recent invasion of Crimea, there is reasonable 
concern among the international community 
over Putin’s ongoing obstructions to 
democracy both within and outside the 
country’s borders. Over the past few years, 
however, opposition groups have emerged 
with hopes of limiting Putin’s power. While 
widespread reform has yet to occur, 
movements to mobilize the Russian public are 
beginning to take place. 
 Putin’s means of maintaining high 
public support are concerning, especially from 
a Western standpoint. During the beginning of 
his presidency, for example, Putin publicly 
denounced the former oligarchs of the 1990s 
by warning that they would no longer have 
political power over the country, only to later 
promote his own generation of oligarchs, with 
whom he exchanged political support for 
economic privilege.3  
Although the extent of his corruption 
may not be evident to the Russian masses, 
Putin’s popularity still hasn’t dipped in the 
midst of other, more publicized conflicts. The 
decision to annex Crimea, for example, was 
overwhelmingly supported by the Russian 
public.4 Additionally, there was no significant 
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change in Putin’s approval ratings during the 
recent economic crisis. Today this number 
remains in the mid-80s, an exceptionally high 
level for a state leader.5 In comparison, Boris 
Yeltsin’s approval rating was estimated to be 
as low as 2 percent at the end of his 
presidency.6 Putin’s approval rating, however, 
may not provide a completely accurate 
representation of the public’s opinion. 
Although it’s widely agreed that Putin is 
generally well liked, critics have noted that 
these polls don’t measure the depth of a 
person’s support, which may not be as great 
as these numbers suggest. Similarly, others 
have pointed out that Putin’s rating may be 
reflection of fear. In an authoritarian state, 
people are more likely to say they approve of 
a leader if they perceive a potential harm in 
voicing their true opinions.7    
 Putin has also been able to effectively 
consolidate political power. During his three 
terms as president and one as prime minister 
— Russian law prohibits the president from 
serving three consecutive terms — Putin has 
limited the civil liberties of his people in order 
to advance his own political agenda. While 
serving as prime minister, Putin ensured he 
was still the primary power in Russia. Prior to 
the elections, he paved the way for his 
protégé Dmitry Medvedev to assume power, 
who instantly assumed a submissive role to 
Putin upon his presidency.8 At the end of his 
term, Medvedev decided not to run for 
reelection, allowing Putin to regain his position 
as president. By controlling the media, 
imprisoning opponents and benefitting from 
suspicious electoral results, Putin has 
positioned himself and the United Russia 
party to maintain political dominance for years 
to come.9 It follows that those attempting to 
depose Putin must overcome myriad 
obstacles. 
*** 
Despite clear difficulties, pro-democracy 
leaders are confident that change is possible: 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been one of the 
most vocal supporters of political reform since 
the beginning of Putin’s presidency. Perhaps 
the most famous individual in Russia besides 
the president himself, Khodorkovsky seems 
an unlikely candidate to lead the shift towards 
a liberal democracy. Once the richest man in 
the country, Khodorkovsky made his fortune 
as an oligarch in the 1990s by taking 
advantage of the country’s post-communist 
instability. 
In order to make his oil business, 
Yukos, more appealing to Western investors, 
Khodorkovsky began to advocate for a more 
transparent Russia in the late-1990s and 
early-2000s. In 2001 he founded Open 
Russia, an organization dedicated to 
promoting Russian democracy. He has since 
admitted that these efforts were initially 
motivated by financial self-interest, claiming, 
“Our position was that, in order for our 
capitalization to grow, we needed a more 
transparent political system”.10  
 Khodorkovsky’s efforts to liberalize 
Russian politics didn’t bode well with Putin. 
Early in his presidency, Putin made it clear 
that he wouldn’t tolerate any political 
involvement from the oligarchs of the 1990s. 
But, in spite of this warning, Khodorkovsky 
continued to openly criticize the president.11 In 
response, Putin had Khodorkovsky arrested 
on charges of fraud and tax evasion in 2003. 
The businessman was subsequently 
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sentenced to nine years in prison. In 2007, 
more charges — this time for embezzlement 
and money laundering — were brought down 
and Khodorkovsky was sentenced to an 
additional seven years. It’s widely agreed that 
both arrests were politically motivated.12  
 In the midst of rumors of a third case 
being held against the former oligarch, Putin 
made the surprising decision to pardon 
Khodorkovsky in December 2013. Many 
believe this was an attempt to improve 
Russia’s reputation in the West after 
accusations of human rights violations prior to 
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.13  When 
asked about Khodorkovsky’s release, 
however, Putin claimed his decision was 
made on humanitarian grounds.14 
 As part of his release, Khodorkovsky 
had to submit to certain conditions:  he was 
not to attempt to regain any of the Yukos 
shares he lost to the state, and he was to 
immediately leave Russia for a life in exile. 
After an initial stay in Germany, Khodorkovsky 
settled in Switzerland, where he remains 
today. Finally, Khodorkovsky was not to 
become involved in Russian politics. Whether 
or not he has followed this third provision 
depends on one’s definition of “political 
involvement.” 
 Khodorkovsky maintains he has no 
desire to become directly involved in Russian 
politics, and that he only wishes to promote 
civil liberties. In Sept. 2014, however, he said 
he would lead Russia “if it appeared 
necessary to overcome the crisis and to carry 
out constitutional reform, the essence of which 
would be to redistribute presidential powers in 
favor of the judiciary, parliament and civil 
society.”15 
The primary means by which 
Khodorkovsky hopes to achieve this goal is 
through the recently revitalized Open Russia 
organization. While Khodorkovsky originally 
founded Open Russia to advance his financial 
interests, the organization is now devoted to 
promoting “independent media, political 
education, and support for political 
prisoners.”16 In doing so, he will help reform 
Russia so that it may become more Western. 
Khodorkovsky estimates that only about 12 
percent of Russians currently favor a 
European-style government.17 Despite this low 
percentage, Khodorkovsky believes that the 
level of support in Moscow may be as high as 
30 percent, leading him to believe that 
democratic values can spread on a larger 
scale. “Since Russian politics is made in big 
cities,” he argues, “these people could have a 
big impact.”18  
 Of course, moving the public to 
support Khodorkovsky’s efforts will be no easy 
task. Putin still has the support of the general 
populace and exercises control over Russian 
media outlets. This latter point has recently 
been of great annoyance to Khodorkovsky 
and his team: Open Russia’s broadcasts are 
frequently disconnected, making it more 
difficult to expand their audience.19  
Additionally, Khodorkovsky’s life in 
exile raises concern about his ability to lead 
an effective campaign. Making the matter 
worse, the majority of Open Russia’s 
management team lives outside the country.20  
Khodorkovsky’s biggest issue, however, may 
be with image maintenance. Many Russians 
still view him as part of the group of oligarchs 
who stole from the country. To this end, 
Khodorkovsky has argued that he already 
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served his time for such offenses. “I’ve done 
my time. And other people’s time,” he stated. 
“And, to those who say I should’ve done more 
time, you try doing ten years.”21  
*** 
Another opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, 
has recently emerged as the new face of the 
movement. The 38 year-old lawyer gained 
prominence in 2008 through LiveJournal, his 
blog devoted to exposing state corruption.  As 
a minority stockholder in Russia’s state-
controlled oil companies and banks, Navalny 
began asking top executives uncomfortable 
questions about incomplete reports of the 
state finances.22  
 Since then, Navalny has successfully 
organized several large-scale protests, most 
notably during the 2011 parliamentary and the 
2012 presidential elections. During the former 
cycle, he denounced United Russia as “the 
party of crooks and thieves”, a sound bite that 
has become a rallying cry for the opposition.23 
After the Dec. 2011 elections, Navalny 
organized several protests in Moscow in 
response to accusations of ballot stuffing, 
which were the largest anti-government 
protests since the fall of the Soviet Union. He 
was arrested shortly thereafter for resisting 
the police and spent 15 days in prison.  
He, however, wasn’t discouraged. 
Later that month, Navalny spoke at another 
protest, in which the number of attendees was 
estimated to be at least 28,000, urging the 
public to recognize their potential to defy Putin 
in the upcoming presidential elections. 24 
During the speech he cried, “Who’s the power 
here?” and the crowd responded, “We are!”25 
Although Putin eventually won, Navalny was 
still able to mount an impressive opposition: In 
March 2012, he organized an anti-Putin 
protest, and an estimated 14,000 to 20,000 
people participated.  
As was the case with Khodorkovsky, 
the response from the Kremlin has been swift 
and brutal: Navalny was arrested for 15 days 
following a protest in May 2012. In Jul. 2013, 
he was again arrested and sentenced to five 
years in prison for embezzlement. He was 
released a day after out of government 
officials fear of backlash.26   
 Nevertheless, in the face of these legal 
threats, Navalny made the bold decision to 
run in the Sept. 2013 Moscow mayoral race. 
He finished in second place, with 27 percent 
of the vote. This was especially remarkable 
because his campaign relied mostly on social 
media.27 Navalny even expressed doubt over 
the results, believing his percentage of the 
votes to be higher.28 
 In his most recent conflict with the 
Kremlin, Navalny, along with his brother Oleg, 
was again subject to trumped-up charges of 
embezzlement in Feb. 2014. Persecutors 
have accused the brothers of stealing about 
$500,000 from the French cosmetics company 
Yves Rocher between 2008 and 2012 in a 
case that’s widely seen as punishment for 
Navalny’s ongoing criticisms of Putin. 29 
Navalny was subsequently placed under 
house arrest and was forbidden to use the 
Internet. 30  When the case went to trial in 
December, Navalny was given a suspended 
prison sentence of 42 months. Meanwhile, his 
brother was given the same sentence, except 
his was to be served immediately. Since the 
court’s decision, Navalny has defied the terms 
of his house arrest multiple times, including to 
join protests of his trial’s decision and also to 
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buy milk at the grocery store. 31 , 32  Navalny 
hasn’t been subtle about these acts either: He 
posted pictures of being out in public and of 
cutting off his ankle bracelet 
to his blog.33  
 On Feb. 17, an 
appeals court upheld both 
Navalny and his brother’s 
sentences. Only a few days 
later, Navalny was given a 
15-day jail sentence for 
handing out pamphlets for 
an anti-Putin rally that was 
to take place in March in 
light of Russia’s recent 
economic troubles. The 
rally, however, evolved to 
serve as a memorial for 
slain opposition leader Boris 
Nemtsov, who was 
murdered on Feb. 27, just 
blocks from the Kremlin. 
Putin’s critics claim that 
Nemtsov’s death was a 
deliberate act by the 
Kremlin meant to instill fear 
in Putin’s opponents. 34 
Navalny admits that 
Nemtsov’s death is a huge 
blow to the opposition 
movement. “We didn’t 
realize how important he 
was until we lost him,” 
Navalny said. “It’s obvious that the only plan 
the Kremlin has for us is destruction. The 
mood has gotten worse. That was the goal. To 
intimidate us and spread more fear.”35  
*** 
While there are definite similarities between 
Khodorkovsky and Nav alny, the two men face 
different obstacles in advancing their efforts. If 
the former hopes to initiate 
a democratic transition 
while in exile, he will need 
to be able to effectively 
communicate with Russian 
citizens. During his 10 
years in prison, the former 
oligarch missed a 
substantial transition in the 
primary method of 
communication: social 
media. He has admittedly 
had difficulty adjusting, 
which may hurt his efforts in 
mobilizing the younger 
generation. 36  On the other 
hand, social media has 
proved to be one of 
Navalny’s greatest 
strengths. Through his 
charisma and wit, Navalny 
has been able to use his 
blog and Twitter to engage 
in fiery attacks on Putin. 
Though Navalny has also 
faced similar difficulties with 
the state-controlled media, 
the real cause for concern 
lies elsewhere. Many are 
wary of his background in 
nationalistic ideologies.37  
 A self-proclaimed “nationalist 
democrat”, Navalny has a long association 
with groups perceived to be xenophobic. He 
has participated in the Russian March, an 
annual event organizing the various Russian 
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nationalist groups where some crowd member 
have made Nazi salutes, and in 2011, 
Navalny spoke on behalf of Stop Feeding the 
Caucasus, a movement intended to end 
federal subsidies to governments in Chechnya 
and the North Caucasus regions.38  In doing 
so, he made several comments that have 
been criticized within the opposition 
movement for being ethnocentric. Likewise, in 
voicing his support for the 2008 war in 
Georgia, Navalny used racial slurs when  
calling for all Georgians to leave Russia.39 He 
was also criticized in 2011 for comments 
against ethnic Chechens following a racial 
altercation in the small Russian town of 
Pugachev. 40  Such actions contradict the 
notion of a liberal Russian state, and in order 
to organize an effective pro-democracy 
movement, Navalny will have to be careful not 
to alienate those with similar goals. 
 It’s important to note that Navalny has 
claimed that his nationalist views have been 
embellished by the Kremlin, and that 
discussing issues important to ethnic 
Russians related to inter-ethnic conflict does 
not entail extreme nationalism.41 Nonetheless, 
many of Navalny’s critics are justified in their 
concerns related to his nationalistic actions. 
Democracy advocates should be wary of 
Navalny’s often-overlooked nationalist 
background. Such tendencies contradict the 
notion of a liberal democracy, which may 
ultimately undermine an eventual democratic 
transition. Navalny, therefore, may not be a 
desirable replacement for Putin should he 
successfully overthrow the president. Due to 
his extensive history of nationalist 
involvement, Navalny has given little reason to 
believe that he would serve as a greater 
proponent for Russian democracy than Putin 
himself. 
*** 
Despite Khodorkovsky and Navalny’s efforts, 
widespread political opposition against Putin 
has yet to be achieved. At this point there 
appears to be little threat to Putin’s power, 
and there are no signs of a democratic 
transition occurring in the near future. This is 
of great concern to the international 
community, as Putin has recently shown an 
increasingly authoritarian presence on the 
world stage. Given Russia’s power as a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council, other countries have sufficient reason 
to question Putin’s intentions. Throughout his 
presidency, Putin has consistently hindered 
democracy in favor of more authoritarian 
practices, and there is no reason to suggest 
he will limit such actions to the internal affairs 
of the country. As Putin has already 
demonstrated, Russia has the ability to extend 
its reach beyond its borders.  
 Thus far, Putin has been successful in 
maintaining support among the vast majority 
of the Russian public, and United Russia has 
shown that it will do whatever necessary to 
maintain political power. Additionally, in light 
of the fear instilled by Boris Nemtsov’s 
murder, the opposition movement against 
Putin has faced a major setback. “If before we 
were demanding honest elections, now we’re 
just demanding to have elections at all,” 
Navalny said. “Our politics has been reduced 
to the most primitive form possible. What can 
we do apart from protests and handing out 
leaflets?” 42  With the opposition movement 
losing momentum and the Kremlin continuing 
to consolidate power, Putin seems poised to 
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retain his position as the primary authority in Russian politics for years to come.  
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